NY Times Editorial:
A new panel on intelligence. I see two interesting situations for the Administration here.
One, the brief CIA directorship of GB Senior. He has given speeches about the efficiency and professionalism of the agency, and ripped those who would reveal agent identities [in ‘99, I believe, he gave such a speech]. It’s a mild mitigation, but will GWB wish to damage or embarrass his father?
Two, CIA information-gathering techniques and subsequent analysis both need to be looked at, how they’ve evolved over time. And not just the entire period of involvement with Iraq (going back to the ‘50’s), but the entire operation.
Here’s the rub: it will beg the obvious question—what of the analyses of the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The fact that the Cold War was a great deal less than what it was played up to be, will become patently obvious. We know now that the Soviet Union was not the military foe we once believed (or were sold) ... remember the “Missile Gap”? The US originally ramped up production on nukes to counter the larger conventional forces the Soviets could field. The Soviets spent the entire duration of the Cold War playing catch-up ... or as much as they could, with their economic challenges. That the Soviets were largely reactive, is a facet ignored in modern history.
That they were perfectly content to encourage our beliefs about their invincibility, has certain modern parallels. I believe you get my drift.
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